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BOOK REVIEW 
Rationing Health Care In America: 
Perceptions and Principles of Justice 
by Larry R, Churchill 
(Notre Dame. IN. University 0/ Notre Dame Press). 1987 
This is a timely and important book. Churchill's purpose is to argue for certain principles 
of justice in health care allocation and to show the differing senses of self and society 
implied by various alternative theories of justice. The book is addressed to medical 
students, doctors, hospital administrators, and those in public policy positions. 
Churchill begins by examining cost escalations in contemporary health care and 
limitations on access to the system. Given the virtually inexhaustible need for health care 
services and their inevitable scarcity even in an affluent nation, Churchill draws the obvious 
conclusion: We must ration health care. Moreover, we do already. At present health care in 
American is rationed by ability to pay, insurance status, disease, age, race, geography, and 
luck. Since the dominant factor influencing all these others is money in the marketplace, 
our present rationing appears invisible. Most people get what they need because they can 
pay for it. Those who can't pay for it often don't get what they need. The logic seems simple 
and straightforward , since it's a logic we accept throughout our economy. Rationing 
appears invisible because no bureaucrat, no system of explicit decision-making, has 
excluded people; they simply can't afford it. To most Americans this has the appearance of 
a fact of nature. 
This view of health care rationing is tied to American individualism. We prize 
independence and privacy. We seek distance from one another. Our conception offreedom 
is essentially negative, a freedom/rom the interference of others. Above all, self-sufficiency 
is valued. Ironically, self-sufficiency in health care is so overly stressed that it often 
expresses itself in its extreme opposite when we are sick, namely, in an abject dependence 
on physicians and the health care system. 
One of the strengths of Churchill's book is his use of concrete images to carry his 
argument. Thus Americans are not so much bound to these values because of adherence to 
abstract principles, but because of the captivating images in certain stories, heroes, and 
models. 
One such image which dominates much of our thinking in health care is the parable of the 
Good Samaritan. In addition to the obviously positive dimensions of this story, there are 
other dimensions that tend to reinforce certain problematic American dispositions . First , 
the action of the Good Samaritan is supererogatory and the patient is wholly passive. There 
is no real concept of a right on the patient's part and very little ability to cooperate. The 
action of the Good Samaritan is also one-on-one. This fits well with therapeutic 
relationships in clinical practice, but is not useful for thinking about systemic issues. What 
would the good Samaritan do, for example, if there were four who needed his help and only 
one who could be helped? Or if helping this patient in need now meant not being able to 
help several others in need later? Finally, of course, the Good Samaritan story is about 
rescuing. This is the main narrative structure in most accounts of contemporary medicine. 
Health care is a rescue from an acute - usually life-threatening - episode. The Good 
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Samaritan story is about rescuing. This is the main narrative structure in most accounts of 
contemporary medicine. Health care is a rescue from an acute - usually life-threatening-
episode. The Good Samaritan story tells us little about individual well ness, disease 
prevention, or how to design a system to keep great numbers of people healthy. 
Churchill also examines some' philsophical theories of justice. He describes the theories 
of John Locke and of contemporaries Robert Nozick and John Rawls. He criticizes each 
for their own commitments to individualism, the assumption that the interests of 
individuals are prior to and precede in importance those of the community. These are not 
unusual criticisms in the cases of Locke and Nozick; the latter is an extreme individualist. 
But Churchill finds the same problem at the root of John Rawls's thought, even though he 
admits that Rawls may have something more to say to us than the others. The Rawlsian self 
on Churchill's account is a "thin rational self, calculating its self-interest in a timeless 
asocial, indeed presocial, existence of dispassionate ignorance." 
Churchill then turns to a description of a more socially-based alternative in the ethical 
theory of 18th century thinker Adam Smith. Best known for his Wealth of Nations. which 
championed capitalism, Smith also developed an ethical theory based fundamentally on 
human sympathy. The moral sense of sympathy fits us by nature for social life together. It 
provides the capability and the affective basis for justice. 
Churchill believes that there is a moral right to health care. We all become ill and we are 
all subject to death. Diseases are seldom directly related to human merit. And health care in 
many cases offers effective treatment. Churchill articulates a right to health care based on 
human need . "A right to health care based on need means a right to equitable access based 
on need alone to all effective care society can reasonably afford." The use of need as a 
criterion is an expression of our social solidarity based on our natural sympathy. Reference 
to what society can afford places a limit on the scope of the right. 
With this theory of justice and conception of a right to health care, Churchill moves to an 
explicit discussion of rationing. The American and British experiences are compared. 
Churchill calls for an accessible and universal system of primary care physicians and other 
health care providers. At this level "relatively pure equity must reign." For more extensive 
. access to health care services the norms of utility - the greatest good for the greatest 
number - must be used explicitly. He offers a priority ranking for these services: 1) very 
expensive therapies which sometimes affect cure or remission, 2) very expensive therapies 
of ambiguous benefit, and 3) elective procedures which satisfy personal desires or correct 
minimal burdens. Churchill believes that with sophisticated technological assessment and 
careful use of the principle of utility, we can make intelligent judgment about which services 
citizens ought to have a right to, beginning with those of the first priority ranking. 
Churchill's writing is exceptionally clear. His use of examples is effective. The target 
audience of this book would be well served by reading it. His discussion of our Good 
Samaritan tradition and individualism in America is especially thoughtful and to the point. 
But there are some shortcomings which must be pointed out - two theoretical and one 
practical. At the theoretical level , Churchill's treatment of Rawls seems unfair. Certainly, 
Rawls does use individual self-interest as a device to articulate a theory of justice. However, 
this is not Ra wls's conception of the self. Instead this is a hypothetical model, a rational 
construction used to determine the details of justice in an imaginary situation demanding 
unanimity and freedom from bias. I doubt that Rawls or any of his followers intends this 
device of "original persons" negotiating behind a "veil of ignorance" as a theory of the 
human self. These hypothetical contractors are heuristic tools , not representatives of the 
real relationships among persons in communities. 
The second theoretical problem is the alternative put forward by Churchill. While 
sympathy is an important dimension of our moral life, it has two fundamental flaws when 
used as a basis for ethical obligation. First is the simple fact that many people are not 
especially sympathetic to the plight of others. Churchill makes this very point in the 
beginning of his book: Sympathy is blunted by the distances people create between 
themselves. Therefore, the natural limitations of sympathy would tend, on this account, to 
limit our sense of obligation to others. Appeal to sympathy is unpersuasive to the 
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unsympathetic, unless there are grounds for an additional claim that they ought to be 
sympathetic. But this raises the second problem, a difficulty which David Hume, Scottish 
contemporary of Smith's, pointed out. Simply because we feel or fail to feel a certain 
sentiment does not of itself imply the necessity to act in any certain way. An ought cannot 
be derived from an is; or, at the least, its derivation is far more difficult conceptually than 
Churchill makes out. To illustrate this point, imagine someone, say Nietzsche, reading 
Churchill's account and reacting with the "wrong" ought: "Yes, some of us do tend to feel 
sympathy, but this is a character flaw, a sign of human weakness. We ought not to." It is 
unclear what Smith's or Churchill's response could be to this challenge. 
The practical shortcoming follows from the expectations that a reader might bring to this 
book. Although Churchill does a good job of discussing the principles involved in rationing 
health care and the theories of justice and of the self which stand behind them, there is little 
practical direction in this book. Readers who are following the legislative innovations in the 
Oregon Medicaid program, for example, and who are looking for a detailed analysis of 
rationing will find little assistance here. 
Despite these reservations, Churchill's book is a welcome addition to our discussions of 
justice and health care distribution. It is a reminder of some of the American cultural 
dispositions which stand in the way of creating a more equitable system. This book moves 
our discussions about American health care forward and it deserves wide readership. 
-Charles J. Dougherty, Ph.D. 
Creighton University 
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